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Research has shown that high vs. low value rewards improve cognitive task performance
independent of whether they are perceived consciously or unconsciously. However,
efficient performance in response to high value rewards also depends on whether or
not rewards are attainable. This raises the question of whether unconscious reward
processing enables people to take into account such attainability information. Building
on a theoretical framework according to which conscious reward processing is required
to enable higher level cognitive processing, the present research tested the hypothesis
that conscious but not unconscious reward processing enables integration of reward
value with attainability information. In two behavioral experiments, participants were
exposed to mask high and low value coins serving as rewards on a working memory
(WM) task. The likelihood for conscious processing was manipulated by presenting the
coins relatively briefly (17ms) or long and clearly visible (300ms). Crucially, rewards were
expected to be attainable or unattainable. Requirements to integrate reward value with
attainability information varied across experiments. Results showed that when integration
of value and attainability was required (Experiment 1), long reward presentation led to
efficient performance, i.e., selectively improved performance for high value attainable
rewards. In contrast, in the short presentation condition, performance was increased for
high value rewards even when these were unattainable. This difference between the
effects of long and short presentation time disappeared when integration of value and
attainability information was not required (Experiment 2). Together these findings suggest
that unconsciously processed reward information is not integrated with attainability
expectancies, causing inefficient effort investment. These findings are discussed in terms
of a unique role of consciousness in efficient allocation of effort to cognitive control
processes.
Keywords: rewards, conscious and unconscious processing, attainability, motivation, cognitive control,
performance
Motivation is an essential determinant of cognitive control and
performance (Watanabe, 2007). Accordingly, a vast body of
research has studied how rewards affect cognition and behav-
ior (Wood et al., 1999). Whereas the neuro-cognitive processes
underlying the effects of rewards on human cognition and behav-
ior are not yet entirely understood (Chiew and Braver, 2011),
it has become clear that the anticipation of rewards can cause
people to increase their effort and performance on various cog-
nitive and behavioral tasks (Brehm and Self, 1989; Camerer and
Hogarth, 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002).
Most research on the effects of rewards on the control of cog-
nition and behavior has focused on consciously communicated
rewards. In these studies people are fully aware of the specific
reward that can be gained through optimal performance on a task.
However, research on unconscious processes in the motivation
and control of goal-directed behavior challenges the assumption
that conscious awareness of rewards is necessary to boost perfor-
mance of cognitive control or working memory (WM) processes
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Hassin et al., 2009; Bargh et al., 2010;
Custers and Aarts, 2010; van Gaal et al., 2010). For instance,
studies have shown that high compared to low rewards boost
performance on WM tasks even when they are presented uncon-
sciously (for a review see Bijleveld et al., 2012). This intriguing
finding offers a new direction to understanding how rewards
affect the control of human cognition and behavior, raising the
question of whether conscious reward processing plays a unique
role in modulating cognitive performance. In the present study,
we aim to explore this issue by investigating how people deal with
attainable and unattainable monetary rewards when such rewards
are consciously or unconsciously processed.
It has long been recognized that presenting valuable rewards
does not necessarily improve task performance (e.g., Hull, 1943;
Brehm and Self, 1989). An important factor in determining
whether a reward will boost performance is whether the reward
is perceived as attainable. Studies addressing the expected value
analysis of human decision making have found that when
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attainability information is provided, people no longer base their
decisions to invest effort on the reward value alone, but on
the combination of value and attainability (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1947; Atkinson, 1957, 1964; Vroom, 1964; Brehm
and Self, 1989; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle,
2002). Performance increases when a reward is both valuable and
attainable, but is reduced whenever a reward is of low value or
unattainable. This finding is consistent with the general notion
that people are conservative in spending their valuable mental
resources (Kool et al., 2010; Gendolla et al., 2012). Thus, from the
above studies, it appears that people readily integrate the value of
a reward with attainability information in order to avoid wasting
effort. However, participants in these studies were always aware
of the value of a reward at stake and the potential influence of
this reward on their performance. In light of work suggesting that
reward pursuit can occur outside of awareness (for a review see
Custers and Aarts, 2010), we investigated the question of how cog-
nitive performance is affected by the value of an unconsciously
perceived reward in a context where the reward is unattainable.
Recently, researchers have developed an experimental
paradigm that allows the examination of this question. In
this paradigm, participants are presented with coins of high
and low value which can be attained as rewards for successful
performance on a task. Importantly, on half of the experimental
trials the reward is presented unconsciously (i.e., subliminally),
whereas the rewards are consciously visible (i.e., supraliminally
presented) on the other trials. This procedure enables the direct
comparison of the effects of conscious and unconscious reward
processing on task performance. Using this paradigm, studies
have shown parallel effects of conscious and unconscious reward
presentation. For instance, in the first study employing this
paradigm (Pessiglione et al., 2007) participants could gain
rewards by squeezing a handgrip. Not surprisingly, high vs.
low value rewards resulted in harder squeezing. Remarkably,
people still squeezed harder for more valuable rewards when
these were presented subliminally. Other studies have found
enhanced mental effort and performance through consciously
and unconsciously-presented high rewards on executive control
and WM tasks, such as active maintenance and updating of
ordered information (Bijleveld et al., 2009; Capa et al., 2011;
Zedelius et al., 2011b; Bustin et al, 2012). However, there have
also been studies showing that conscious and unconscious
rewards in some task contexts can lead to different effects (e.g.,
Bijleveld et al., 2010, 2011; Zedelius et al., 2011b).
Recently, a theoretical framework has recently been proposed
to account for both identical and divergent effects of con-
scious and unconscious rewards on performance. This framework
distinguishes initial (or unconscious) reward processing from
full (or conscious) reward processing (Bijleveld et al., 2012).
According to this framework, people initially process rewards
in rudimentary brain structures that respond to the value of
rewards and boost task performance directly by causing increased
recruitment of effort. This process is thought to operate without
requiring conscious awareness, which explains why unconsciously
perceived rewards can enhance performance. After initial reward
processing, when rewards are consciously perceived (e.g., by
prolonging presentation time from subliminal to supraliminal)
rewards may be processed more fully, involving higher-level cog-
nitive processing. In line with previous research on conscious and
unconscious perception (Dehaene et al., 1989), this higher-level
cognitive processing is thought to enable more complex cognitive
processes and strategic behavioral responses, which could explain
why conscious reward processing in some task contexts leads to
unique effects.
In experiments, initial (or unconscious) and full (or con-
scious) reward processing is commonly manipulated by pre-
senting masked reward stimuli (e.g., 1 cent vs. 50 cents coins)
either for relatively short (i.e., 17ms) or relatively long durations
(i.e., 300ms). Subsequent subliminality tests are usually admin-
istered to provide evidence that the short presentation of masked
reward stimuli renders participants unable to identify the reward
value of the stimuli. However, it is questionable whether such
tests provide conclusive evidence that short stimulus presentation
time prevents conscious perception throughout an experimen-
tal task. In fact, there is an ongoing debate about what kinds of
subliminality tests are capable of providing sufficient proof for
unconscious processing (e.g., see Seth et al., 2008; Sandberg et al.,
2010). In the present research, we took a different approach aimed
at distinguishing conscious from unconscious reward processing
by investigating a situation in which the two types of reward
processing are predicted to produce different behavioral effects.
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that conscious and uncon-
scious reward value processing differ with regard to taking into
account attainability information.
As explained above, when consciously processed rewards vary
in attainability, people base their decisions to invest effort on
the combination of reward value and attainability. Integration
of these two types of information prevents wasting resources
on valuable yet unattainable rewards or attainable yet low value
rewards (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Atkinson, 1957,
1964; Vroom, 1964; Brehm and Self, 1989; Camerer and Hogarth,
1999; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
Research suggests that the value of a reward and the likelihood
that a reward can be attained are initially encoded by distinct sub-
cortical brain networks (Rogers et al., 1999; Dreher et al., 2006;
O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), and that the integration of these dif-
ferent signals involves higher cortical processing (Knutson et al.,
2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Haber
and Knutson, 2009). Therefore, based on the framework out-
lined above, we predicted that the integration of reward value and
attainability requires conscious reward processing. Consequently,
when the likelihood of conscious processing is reduced (i.e., by
short presentation of rewards), people should fail to integrate
reward value and attainability information, resulting in inefficient
investment of effort and performance.
The notion that conscious information processing allows for
greater integration and more flexible behavioral control is cen-
tral to several information processing approaches to conscious-
ness (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2002; Dijksterhuis
and Aarts, 2010; Morsella and Bargh, 2010). However, empiri-
cal studies have thus far found both support for (e.g., Kunde,
2003; Ansorge et al., 2011) and evidence against (e.g., Lau and
Passingham, 2007; Hassin et al., 2009; van Gaal et al., 2010) the
hypothesis that conscious information processing plays a unique
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role in modulating cognitive performance. For instance, stud-
ies have shown that subliminally presented stop cues can slow
down, but rarely fully inhibit behavioral responses (van Gaal
et al., 2008, 2009). Moreover, unconscious stop cues failed to
elicit the same globally-distributed and sustained pattern of brain
activation observed in response to consciously perceived cues.
This work suggests that although unconsciously perceived cues
can trigger basic cognitive control processes, conscious percep-
tion may enable more efficient and flexible control of behavior
(Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
The present study aims to shed more light on possible advan-
tages of conscious over unconscious reward processing by focus-
ing not only on the initial triggering of cognitive performance
by consciously and unconsciously perceived rewards, but on how
integration of rewards with attainability information affects per-
formance. Because reward value and attainability information
are two distinct aspects of rewards (Brehm and Self, 1989; Liu
et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), we
expect that full or conscious processing of reward information
is necessary to integrate these two types of information and
arrive at efficient performance. To test this novel hypothesis, we
report behavioral data from two experiments in which we pre-
sented participants with high and low-value rewards (coins of
50 or 1 eurocents, respectively) that were instructed to be either
attainable or unattainable by successfully performing an active
maintenance task. To manipulate the likelihood of conscious vs.
unconscious processing, the coins were masked and presented
either for relatively long (300ms) or short (17ms) durations. We
manipulated conscious processing of the reward value rather than
attainability information in order to connect our research with
previous work on conscious vs. unconscious reward processing
(Pessiglione et al., 2007; for an overview see Bijleveld et al., 2012).
Importantly, in order to provide evidence that differences
between the effects of long vs. briefly presented rewards are
not merely caused by the presentation of attainability infor-
mation, but are due specifically to differences in the ability to
integrate the reward value with attainability information, we
manipulated the need for information integration across two
experiments. As explained below, Experiment 1 was designed
to make integration a requirement for efficient performance,
whereas Experiment 2 was designed to eliminate the necessity of
integration for efficient performance. Based on the theory that
conscious and unconscious reward processing differ in the abil-
ity to integrate value and attainability, we expected that conscious
and unconscious reward processing would lead to different effects
in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. We outline the concrete
predictions for the two experiments in more detail below.
Experiment 1 was designed to establish different behavioral
effects of quick vs. slowly presented rewards when integrating
reward value and attainability was required for efficient responses.
This was accomplished by testing performance in response to
attainable and unattainable high vs. low value rewards in a full
within-subject design. Value and attainability are two distinct
sources of performance motivation, and hence performance may
be increased by higher reward value, or by the fact that a reward
is attainable (e.g., Atkinson, 1957, 1964; Vroom, 1964; Brehm
and Self, 1989; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). However, when both
reward value and attainability vary on a trial-by-trial basis, it is
essential to integrate on each trial the two sources of motiva-
tion to derive an optimal decision to invest effort (e.g., Anderson,
1971; Brehmer and Joyce, 1988). In this context, we expected
that when rewards were presented for a relatively long duration,
enabling conscious processing, performance should be enhanced
selectively for high value attainable rewards. This result would
constitute a conceptual replication of previous work (Atkinson,
1957, 1964; Vroom, 1964; Brehm and Self, 1989; Camerer and
Hogarth, 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). Examining effects of
consciously processed rewards also serves as a control condition
to verify that attainability information was clearly and unambigu-
ously processed and that participants were able and motivated to
take this information into account.
When rewards are presented for a shorter duration, reducing
the likelihood of conscious processing, we predicted a differ-
ent pattern of results. Without the ability to integrate value and
attainability information, participants were expected to invest
their effort based either on the high (vs. low) value of a reward,
or on the fact that rewards could be gained (vs. not), but not on a
combination of both sources of performance motivation. This led
to the following predictions: First, the instruction that a reward
is attainable vs. unattainable should boost performance. Second,
the perception of high vs. low value rewards should likewise boost
performance. Most importantly, without the ability to integrate
value with attainability information, perception of high value
rewards should boost performance, even when it is clear that
the reward is unattainable. In summary, we expected that perfor-
mance would be boosted independently by the fact that a reward
can be earned and the presentation of a high value coin. This
should result in main effects of reward value and attainability.
Experiment 2 was designed to provide attainability infor-
mation without requiring trial-by-trial integration with reward
value. To do so, we manipulated the attainability of rewards
between participants. The idea behind this was that when attain-
ability information constitutes a stable dimension for an indi-
vidual (cf. Waltz et al., 1999), participants can employ a general
response strategy that is valid on every trial without requiring
integration of incoming information. More specifically, when
rewards are always attainable, participants can respond effi-
ciently based on reward value alone. Likewise, when rewards are
always unattainable, the decision to invest effort can be based on
this information alone, neglecting the reward value. Hence, in
Experiment 2 participants were expected to perform better for
high vs. low attainable rewards regardless of whether rewards were
presented for long or short duration (e.g., Pessiglione et al., 2007;
Zedelius et al., 2011b). Moreover, we expected participants to per-
form equally well for unattainable rewards, regardless of whether




Participants were 41 undergraduate students (28 female).
A 2 (presentation duration: long vs. short) × 2 (value: low
vs. high) × 2 (attainability: attainable vs. unattainable) within-
participants design was employed.
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Procedure
Participants performed a verbal active maintenance task in which
they were asked to actively maintain word spans of five one-
syllable nouns in WM while inhibiting mild distraction during
a short delay interval (see Conway et al., 2005; Zedelius et al.,
2011b). For an overview of the procedure including pictures of the
reward- and masking stimuli, see Figure 1. Participants were told
that on every trial of the maintenance task, coins were presented
that served as rewards for correct responses. Participants were fur-
ther told that the coins would sometimes be “difficult to perceive”
(referring to the short presentation condition). Furthermore, par-
ticipants learned that the money would not always be attainable,
and that they would be paid the amount of rewards earned on
attainable reward trials at the end of the experiment.
Each trial started with the message, “Reward can be attained”
or “Reward cannot be attained”, presented for 2000ms. Following
a previously developed procedure, a fixation cross was then shown
on the screen for 1000ms, followed by a mask (a scrambled pic-
ture of both 1 and 50 cents coins) for 1000ms, followed by the
presentation of a 1 cent or 50 cents coin. The coin was pre-
sented for either 300ms (long presentation condition) or 17ms
(short presentation condition) and followed by a post-mask pre-
sented for 600ms, minus the duration of the coin. Subliminality
of the stimuli was tested in a separate detection task with 25
different participants. On each trial, participants saw a coin
(1 cent vs. 50 cent), presented in the same way as in the exper-
iment (17ms in between masks). After each coin, participants
indicated the value of the coin. A t-test indicated identification
of the coins was no better than chance (M = 0.51, SD = 0.11),
t(24) = 0.43, n.s. (see Bijleveld et al., 2009 for another sublimi-
nality check of this procedure)1.
After the coin presentation, the target words were presented
for 400ms per word, with an inter-word interval of 200ms.
The presentation of the target words was followed by a delay
period during which mildly distracting letter strings were shown
for 800ms each intermitted by intervals of 500ms. After this
delay period, participants were asked to verbally report the tar-
get words. Performance was considered correct when all five
words were correctly reported. The order in which the words
were reported could be arbitrary (see Zedelius et al., 2011a, for
the validity of this measure). Finally, accuracy feedback and,
for attainable reward trials, the amount obtained was shown.
1The fact that coin identification was at chance level calls for an objective
assessment that the coins were indeed presented. For this purpose, we ran
the experiment again on one of the computers used for data collection, and
recorded 18 trials of the 17ms coin presentation using a camera with a slow
motion feature (a Sony NX4), enabling recording of the coin presentation at
the rate of 240 frames per second. Inspection of the recordings showed that
the coin was visible in each recording.
FIGURE 1 | Overview of the procedure of Experiment 1.
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The task consisted of 56 randomly presented trials (seven repeti-
tions per condition). After the experiment, participants were paid
the amount of money they had earned throughout the task. The
experiment was conducted according to institutional guidelines
and approved by the local ethics committee.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To test our hypothesis that the duration of reward presenta-
tion affects the integration of reward value and attainability
information, the proportion of correct trials2 was subjected
2Because earning rewards (on attainable reward trials) was contingent on
recalling all words correctly, accuracy was operationalized as the correct recall
of all five words. Because this demand was clear from the instructions, we rea-
soned that the total number of words recalled per trial would be a suboptimal
performance measure in the present experiment. (For a more detailed discus-
sion of this argument, see Zedelius et al., 2011a). However, for both studies,
the pattern of results for the total number of words recalled resembled that of
the accuracy data. Specifically, in Experiment 1, analysis of the total num-
ber of correctly recalled words yielded a marginally significant main effect
of attainability, F(1, 40) = 3.56, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.08, which was qualified by a
marginally significant three-way interaction of attainability× reward value×
exposure, F(1, 40) = 3.00, p = 0.09, η2p = 0.07. When rewards were attain-
able, performance was higher for high (M = 4.32, SD = 0.59) compared to
low value rewards (M = 4.08, SD = 0.72) in the long presentation condition,
F(1, 40) = 5.18, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.11, but performance was equally high for
high (M = 4.33, SD = 0.52) and low (M = 4.31, SD = 0.46) value rewards
in the short presentation condition, F(1, 40) = 0.12, n.s. When rewards were
unattainable, performance did not differ for high (M = 4.16, SD = 0.69) and
low value rewards (M = 4.16, SD = 0.61) in the long presentation condi-
tion, F(1, 40) < 0.001, n.s. Performance appeared to be somewhat higher for
high (M = 4.19, SD = 0.72) compared to low (M = 4.12, SD = 0.60) value
rewards in the short presentation condition, although this latter increase was
not statistically significant (F(1, 40) = 0, 71, n.s.). In Exp. 2, we found a sig-
nificant interaction of attainability x reward value, F(1, 31) = 5.18, p = 0.03,
to repeated-measures ANOVA according to the experimental
design. The analysis revealed a main effect of attainability,
[F(1, 40) = 4.63, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.10], qualified by the predicted
three-way interaction of presentation duration × value × attain-
ability, [F(1, 40) = 6.20, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.13] (see Figure 2). To
test the hypothesis that in the long presentation condition effort
is selectively increased when rewards are both high and attain-
able, we performed a specific contrast comparing performance
on the long presented high value attainable reward trials with
performance on the other trials within the long presentation con-
dition. This contrast was significant, F(1, 40) = 8.07, p = 0.007,
η2p = 0.17, indicating that performance was indeed selectively
increased for high value attainable rewards. This result is in
line with classic theories of motivation that predict enhanced
effort and performance only when rewards are both valuable and
attainable (e.g., Hull, 1943; Brehm and Self, 1989).
In the short presentation condition we expected that reward
value and attainability information would boost performance
independently, resulting in main effects of reward value and
attainability. However, contrary to this prediction, we found no
main effect of reward value, F(1, 40) = 1.25, n.s., and no main
effect of attainability, F(1, 40) = 2.52, n.s. Instead, we found a
marginally significant interaction of reward value and attain-
ability, [F(1, 40) = 3.50, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.06]. Further inspec-
tion of this interaction with simple effects analyses indicated
η2p = 0.14, indicating performance was not influenced by the reward value in
the unattainable reward condition (high reward value:M = 4.16, SD = 0.50;
low reward value: M = 4.20, SD = 0.44), F(1, 31) = 0.38, n.s., but perfor-
mance was increased for high (M = 4.32, SD = 0.40) vs. low value rewards
(M = 4.13, SD = 0.58) in the attainable reward condition, F(1, 31) = 6.33,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.17, and this effect did not differ for the long and short
presentation conditions, F(1, 31) = 0.21, n.s.
FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. Mean and standard error of the percentage of correct trials as a function of reward value, presentation duration, and
attainability. Error bars = SE.
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that performance increased in response to high vs. low value
rewards when these were unattainable, [F(1, 40) = 4.52, p = 0.04,
η2p = 0.10]. Thus, consistent with the prediction outlined in
the introduction, high reward value of briefly presented coins
boosted performance even when the reward was unattainable
(note that the clarity of the attainability information can be
inferred from the conscious reward condition). Moreover, and
consistent with the prediction that the opportunity to obtain a
reward would boost performance in the short presentation con-
dition, we found that performance was increased in response to
attainable compared to unattainable low value presented rewards,
[F(1, 40) = 6.31, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.14]. However, and contrary to
our expectation, we found that performance on attainable reward
trials was equally high for both high and low value coins, F < 1.
The absence of a boosting effect of high value in this latter com-
parison likely explains why we did not obtain the expected two
main effects.
How can we explain the unexpected finding that performance
in the briefly presented attainable reward condition was unaf-
fected by the value of the rewards? First, we can rule out that
the value of the rewards was not encoded in the short presenta-
tion condition. This is attested by the effect of reward value in
the briefly presented unattainable reward condition. We can also
rule out that the absence of an effect of value in the attainable
reward condition was merely due to a lack of statistical power.
That is, previous research testing the effects of attainable rewards
on performance using the same experimental task and proce-
dure (Zedelius et al., 2011b; low distraction condition) indicates
that the effect of briefly presented rewards is of small to medium
size (dz = 0.41; Cohen, 1988). According to a power analysis
using the statistical software G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), the
chance of detecting an effect of this size with a desired statistical
power of minimally 0.80 at an alpha level of 0.05 requires a sam-
ple of at least 39 participants, which we exceeded in the present
experiment.
Accordingly, we think that there may be a theoretical expla-
nation for why performance in the briefly presented attainable
reward condition was unaffected by reward value. As argued
above, without the ability to integrate reward value and attainabil-
ity information, the mere fact that a reward is attainable should
cause participants to recruit effort to perform well. This hypoth-
esis was confirmed by the fact that performance was boosted in
response to low value attainable rewards within the short pre-
sentation condition. The question is whether performance can be
increased even further by the presentation of an attainable high
value reward. The absence of a main effect of value suggests that
this may not be possible. One straightforward explanation for the
absence of a value effect in this condition is that the mere oppor-
tunity to gain a reward already promoted maximal investment
of effort, leaving no room for an additive effect of high reward
value on performance. This explanation is consistent with other
research showing that factors that independently increase motiva-
tion for action (e.g., testosterone and reward cues) do not produce
additive effects, probably because motivation is already boosted
to its limits by one factor alone, minimizing the contribution of
a second source of motivation (see Aarts and van Honk, 2009).
This argument implies that we should obtain an effect of value
when variation in attainability is not a source of performance
enhancement. This issue is addressed in Experiment 2.
Because this experiment is the first examination of conscious
and unconscious reward effects under varying attainability con-
ditions within the same task, one question that comes to mind is
whether performance in response to attainable and unattainable
rewards was influenced by reward attainability on the previ-
ous trial. Although we did not predict this, it is an interesting
possibility that should be taken into account in light of evi-
dence for performance adjustments instigated by specific trial
sequences (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Boy et al., 2010; Ansorge et al.,
2011). Therefore, we explored whether attainability sequence (i.e.,
whether attainability on trial n was the same vs. different from
trial n–1) affected the results reported above. Specifically, we per-
formed an additional repeated-measures ANOVAwith the factors
reward value, presentation duration, attainability, and attainabil-
ity sequence. The results showed no main effect of attainability
sequence, and no interaction effects of attainability sequence with
any of the above reported factors (all Fs < 1.14). These findings
indicate that the differential effects of attainable and unattainable
rewards were not affected by the presence or absence of the chance
to attain a reward on the previous trial.
Another question that may be raised is whether different
effects of long vs. short presentation of attainable and unattain-
able rewards may be driven by feedback learning. Although par-
ticipants received accuracy feedback on all trails, feedback about
the amount of reward obtained could only be given on attainable
reward trials. Could differences in feedback between the attain-
able and unattainable conditions account for the effects reported
above? We do not expect this for a number of reasons: first,
we used reward stimuli that were familiar to participants from
everyday life so that the reward value likely did not require learn-
ing. Second, on attainable reward trials, the coins presented at
the beginning of a trial were 100% indicative of the amount of
reward to be earned given optimal performance. Thus, and unlike
in some other studies (e.g., Knutson et al., 2005; Dreher et al.,
2006; Bjork and Hommer, 2007; Tobler et al., 2007), there was no
ambiguity about the amount that could be earned on each trial.
Moreover, an explanation in terms of added learning on attain-
able reward trials would be inconsistent with the finding that
the briefly presented high vs. low rewards selectively increased
performance in the unattainable reward condition, where no
feedback was given about the reward value. However, to statis-
tically rule out that learning played a role in driving the above
effects, we performed an additional analysis including factors of
the experimental design and the additional factor block (i.e., first
vs. second half of the trials). The results showed that block did not
interact significantly with any of the reported effects, and, most
importantly, it did not qualify the above mentioned three way
interaction of reward value, presentation duration, and attain-
ability, [F(1, 40) = 1.57, ns]. Consequently, differences in feedback
learning from attainable and unattainable reward trials do not
seem to account for different effects of long vs. briefly presented
attainable and unattainable rewards.
If our predictions outlined in the introduction are cor-
rect and conscious compared to unconscious reward processing
enables greater integration of value and attainability information,
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differences between the effects of conscious and unconscious
rewards should vanish when people do not need to integrate this
information. To test this hypothesis in Experiment 2, we varied
attainability information between, rather than within, partici-
pants such that the rewards were either always attainable or always
unattainable. When rewards are always attainable, only the value
dimension is important to boost performance, and no informa-
tion integration is required. Therefore, we predicted performance
to be enhanced by both long and short presentation of high com-
pared to low value rewards. In contrast, when rewards are always
unattainable, and thus never worth the effort, incoming infor-
mation about the reward value becomes irrelevant. In this case,




Participants were 33 undergraduates (24 female). The design
was a 2 (presentation duration: long vs. short) × 2 (value: low
vs. high) × 2 (attainability: attainable vs. unattainable) mixed
design with duration and value as within-participants factors and
attainability as between-participants factor.
Procedure
The same WM task was used as in Experiment 1, with the only
difference that reward attainability instructions varied between
participants. In the attainable reward condition, participants were
told that the coins displayed throughout the task were rewards
that could be attained for accurate performance. In the unattain-
able reward condition, participants were told that the coins had
functioned as rewards for performance in a previous experiment,
but that in this Experiment the rewards were unattainable. In this
condition, participants received a flat rate of 5 euros for their
participation in the experiment. The experiment was conducted
in accordance with institutional guidelines and approved by the
local ethics committee.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The proportion of correct trials was subjected to an ANOVA
according to the design. There were no main effects of presenta-
tion duration, F(1, 31) = 1.15, p = 0.29, reward value, F(1, 31) =
2.16, p = 0.15, or attainability, F < 1. However, we did find the
predicted interaction between value and attainability, [F(1, 31) =
5.62, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.15]. This interaction was not qualified by a
three-way interaction with presentation duration, F < 1. Simple
effects analyses showed, first that when rewards were attainable,
both long and short presentation of high compared to low value
rewards increased performance, [F(1, 31) = 6.75, p = 0.01, η2p =
0.18] (see Figure 3). This finding is a direct replication of pre-
vious studies (e.g., Pessiglione et al., 2007; Bijleveld et al., 2010;
Capa et al., 2011; Zedelius et al., 2011b). This replication is
particularly important in light of the unexpected finding from
Experiment 1 that performance for briefly presented attainable
rewards was unaffected by the reward value. As argued above, in a
context of varying opportunity to attain rewards (Experiment 1),
the instruction that a reward was attainable caused participants to
invest maximal effort in response to briefly presented low value
rewards, leaving no room for further improved by high reward
value. The present findings from the second experiment show that
the performance boost for briefly presented low value attainable
rewards does not occur when attainability is a fixed factor within
participants.
The results further showed that, when rewards were unattain-
able, performance for both long and briefly presented rewards
was unaffected by the reward value, F < 1. This finding confirms
our prediction that short presentation of unattainable high value
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 2. Mean and standard error of the percentage of correct trials as a function of reward value, presentation duration, and
compensation. Error bars = SE.
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rewards does not lead to enhanced performance when integration
of reward value and attainability information is unnecessary for
efficient responding. When it is clear that rewards are never
attainable, and hence high value rewards are never worth invest-
ing extra effort, people can employ the same general and pre-
defined response strategy throughout the task. That is, they can
prepare to ignore the value of rewards even before the rewards
are presented. Such a strategy might alter their perception of
the rewards such that high value rewards are no longer per-
ceived as valuable or rewarding (Delgado et al., 2008; Staudinger
et al., 2009). As such, results of Experiment 2 converge well
with work showing that when rewards are irrelevant for behav-
ioral responses, initial reward processing in the subcortical reward
system is unaffected by the reward value (Bjork and Hommer,
2007).
In summary, the results from Experiment 2 suggest that both
conscious and unconscious reward processing can boost per-
formance efficiently when there is no requirement to integrate
value and attainability information. In light of Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 provides further evidence that conscious compared
to unconscious reward processing promotes the integration of
incoming reward value and attainability information.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to test whether conscious com-
pared to unconscious processing of rewards leads to more efficient
cognitive task performance based on the successful integration
of reward value and attainability information. To examine this
question, we first examined the situation in which the need for
integration was relatively high by varying value and attainability
information on a trial-by-trial basis (Experiment 1). In line with
traditional theories ofmotivation and decisionmaking (e.g., Hull,
1943; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Atkinson, 1957,
1964; Vroom, 1964; Brehm and Self, 1989), we found that when
coins were presented for a relatively long duration, and could thus
be consciously perceived, performance increased selectively for
valuable and attainable rewards. In contrast, brief presentation of
the coins led to rather inefficient effort investment and perfor-
mance. First, and most stunning, participants worked harder for
high compared to low rewards despite their conscious knowledge
that the rewards were unattainable. Second, when participants
were instructed that rewards were attainable, performance was
increased regardless of the reward value. These findings suggest
that brief presentation of rewards, which reduces the likelihood of
conscious processing, causes failure to integrate reward value and
attainability information. Moreover, our data suggest that in the
absence of integration, high reward value and information that a
reward is attainable do not improve performance in an additive
way. Instead, people invest maximal effort in response to either
source of motivation.
The fact that performance was more efficient when reward
information was presented for a relatively long duration speaks
to the hypothesis that conscious awareness enables processes that
lead to more strategic behavior. This finding converges well with
the framework outlined in the introduction, according to which
initial or unconscious reward processing can directly facilitate
task performance, but full or conscious reward processing is
needed to modulate performance strategically (Bijleveld et al.,
2012). Support for the direct facilitation of performance through
rewards comes from neuroscience research showing that the value
of rewards is first encoded in a subcortical reward network,
including most prominently the ventral striatum (VS) (Phillips
et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2009). The VS is also responsi-
ble for translating the reward value into effort by projecting to
frontal cortical areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
which modulate executive control processes (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Liljeholm and O’Doherty, 2012; Schmidt et al.,
2012). This may explain why unconsciously perceived rewards
can facilitate effortful cognitive performance. However, according
to the framework (Bijleveld et al., 2012), conscious awareness of
rewards allows for more complex, higher-level cognitive process-
ing (see also Dehaene et al., 1989). Such higher level processing
likely includes activation of the medial and orbital prefrontal
cortex, regions that are involved in evaluating the likelihood
that a reward can be attained (Rogers et al., 1999; Knutson
et al., 2005; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010). This may explain why
consciously processed rewards lead to more efficient effort invest-
ment based on the combination of reward value and attainability
information.
Further evidence for the crucial role of consciousness in
integrating value and attainability information stems from
Experiment 2, where we show that long and short presentation
of rewards lead to parallel effects on performance when integra-
tion of value and attainability was irrelevant. That is, irrespective
of presentation duration of the reward information, participants
performed better for relatively high attainable rewards, but per-
formance was similar for high and low rewards when these were
unattainable. An interesting question raised by this latter find-
ing is whether the coins were still perceived as rewarding when
they are always unattainable. Although money is generally desir-
able (Lea and Webley, 2006), it is possible that the perception
of money as a performance reward depends on the potential of
attaining it (cf. Biner and Hannon, 1988; Richter and Gendolla,
2006). Further research is therefore needed to determine whether
cognitive task performance is boosted by unconscious reward
cues as a function of the actual or perceived rewarding property
of the cues.
It is important to note that a few recent studies have shown
that conscious and unconscious rewards can sometimes have dif-
ferent effects on cognitive control task performance. For instance,
it has been shown that conscious, but not unconscious high
rewards impair performance when they are presented during the
execution of an active maintenance task, probably due to distrac-
tion (Zedelius et al., 2011b). Furthermore, while unconsciously
presented monetary rewards were shown to reduce the atten-
tional blink effect (assessed by the rapid serial visual presentation
task; Raymond et al., 1992), conscious rewards augmented the
attentional blink effect resulting from the (normatively learned)
tendency to concentrate too much on task stimuli when one
knows that rewards are relatively high (Bijleveld et al., 2011).
These previous studies point to an advantage of unconscious
reward processing in boosting cognitive control performance.
The present study contributes to this research by demonstrating
that the advantageous or disadvantageous effects of conscious vs.
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unconscious rewards depend on the ability to combine relevant
information to arrive at efficient cognitive task performance.
The results of the present study have important implica-
tions for current debates about the role of consciousness in
motivation and decision making (Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010;
Baumeister et al., 2011). That is, even though information
integration is sometimes proposed to be dependent on con-
scious processing (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars,
2002; Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010; Morsella and Bargh, 2010;
however, see Mudrik et al., 2011), conscious and unconscious
processing are rarely compared directly to test differences in
integration. Employing a paradigm where conscious and uncon-
scious reward processing can directly be compared, the present
study suggests that conscious awareness plays a crucial role in
the integration of reward value and attainability information
to arrive at an optimal decision about whether it is worth-
while to invest effort. This ability to integrate different types of
reward related information may not be constrained to value and
attainability information. Even when valuable rewards are attain-
able, people may judge them not worth the effort, for instance
because they are very hard to get or because they are attain-
able only after a considerable delay (e.g., Kivetz, 2003; Raynolds,
2006). Such judgments imply the combination of reward value
with information about effort and time requirements (Ballard
and Knutson, 2009). Although the exact mechanisms behind
these judgments go beyond the current research, our find-
ings suggest that they may benefit from conscious awareness of
rewards.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The present findings raise interesting questions for future
research. First, given that (attainable and unattainable) uncon-
sciously perceived rewards can motivate people to work, this leads
to the question of how people might experience this motivation.
Although the framework outlined above makes a qualitative dis-
tinction between conscious and unconscious reward processing,
this framework does not imply that rewards perceived outside of
conscious awareness can never gain access to consciousness, or
affect conscious experience in any way. For instance, when peo-
ple become motivated by unconscious rewards, they may become
aware of this motivation, either indirectly, by observing their
own behavior, or more directly, by noticing potential changes in
their mood or arousal which may be related to their motivated
behavior (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1990; Knutson et al., 2005;
Chartrand et al., 2010). Although this topic goes beyond the scope
of the current investigation, it remains an interesting direction
for future research. Within the present research, however, there
is no evidence that potential downstream effects of unconscious
rewards on conscious experience could help the strategic control
of efficient effortful performance.
Another interesting topic for future research is how conscious
expectations with regard to the value of unconsciously processed
rewards affect performance and motivation. For instance, would
a person work harder for an unconsciously perceived low value
attainable reward when he or she consciously expects it to be
of high, rather than low value? In the light of the present stud-
ies, we can only speculate about this issue. In the present study,
when attainability varied throughout the task, participants based
their decisions to invest effort either on high value of a reward,
or the fact that the reward was attainable. This suggests that
people are most strongly influenced by information that triggers
motivational behavior. Information that should reducemotivated
behavior (i.e., the fact that a high value reward was not attain-
able, or that an attainable reward was of low value) appeared
to have less impact. Therefore, we would predict that conscious
expectancies related to reward value could overrule the effects
of unconsciously perceived rewards when people expect a high
value reward, but unconsciously perceived high value should
drive behavior when people expect to work for a low value reward.
It would be interesting to test these predictions in future work,
for instance by manipulating the (perceived) ratio of high to low
value rewards.
CONCLUSION
The present study extended recent research on conscious and
unconscious reward pursuit by addressing the issue of how
people deal with unattainable rewards. The findings from two
experiments with different experimental designs suggest that con-
scious perception of rewards enables people to integrate the value
of monetary rewards with fluctuating attainability information.
Thus, while consciousness of rewards is certainly not necessary to
boost cognitive task performance, it appears to be crucial to arrive
at efficient effort investment when confronted with attainable and
unattainable rewards.
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